Working from both a phenomenological and a biological background. the conditi ons under which the emergence of intentionality occurs, are approached. This is done via two particularities of biological systems: the inside/outside distinction they exhibit and the fact that they are sensitive. The phenomenon of boundaries turns out to be a crucial issue in such an account. '1 0 start from a biological level is an indispensable preparation for a proper understanding of intentionality, phenomenologically conceived.
Intentionality: A phenomenological background
This article works from both a biological foundation and a phenomenological perspective. in the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Throughout his work. Husser! has made extensive studies of the concept of intentionality. while Merieau-Ponty has made more implicit and critical contributions to the issue (Merleau-Ponty. 1972 . 1978 . One can find in the work of Husser! an elaborate account of the structure of consciousness. as a complex system of intentionally directed acts. Husserl never characterizes intentionality as a mere relation of aboutness. but as the meaningful relation of a subject to an object. MerleauPonty transforms Husser!'s "pure" (i.e. without any relations to the psychophysical world) subject into an embodied one. an operation which shows that intentionality is rooted and maintained because of the embodiment of the subject. No intentionality without a living and lived body. Although Husserl gave a description of the way the subject is pulled toward the object or allows an object to be of interest for the subject (Husser!. 1999) . we think that a full account of the aspect of the meaningfulness of the intentional relation is only possible after the transformation accomplished by Merleau-Ponty. We won't pursue the phenomenological line primarily here, but three remarks should indicate why a phenomenological background is present.
First, mind-like phenomena, such as intentionality, are often studied from a one-sided angle, in which the mental is considered as something quasiautonomous, i.e. without a necessary relation to the body and the environment. Classical cognitive sciences and analytical philosophy of mind are examples of such an approach. Consciousness and intentionality are studied directly, without questioning the conditions under which such phenomena (can) emerge. In such approaches, consciousness is considered inherently language-like and, consequently, intentionality is conceived of in terms of formal symbols or propositional attitudes. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological work shows, in opposition to classical cognitive-scientific approaches and philosophy of mind, that the mental, and intentionality in particular, cannot be studied as phenomena dissociated from the bodily characteristics of the system in which they occur.
Second, as both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have shown, intentionality is intrinsically related to meaning or to an interest that emerges from the intentional system. No intentional object without a system that is interested in that object. It could be said that a system is constitutive of the object, in a sense that before or at the same time an object is cognitively explored, this must have originated from or be accompanied by a motivational interest of the system itself (see also Ellis, 1999) . Intentionality can never be mere aboutness, i.e. the intentional relation is not constituted merely by a reference to something else. Third, to approach living systems basically in terms of an inside/outsidedistinction and sensitivity, as will be done here, reminds us of the way in which the phenomenological tradition has approached existence as being-in-theworld: a living being defines itself in relation to the external, and therefore is inherently involved in the world. In the light of the recent project of naturalizing phenomenology (see Petitot et al., 1999) , it is a good exercise to try to establish the basic terms of a being-in-the world at a fundamental level, i.e. at the level where the living defines itself as an entity separate but related to the outside world. In some way, the living already is a being-in-the-world at the biological level. Therefore, one can try to trace the history of intentionality in the biological layer, which is not restricted to humans. It might be that being human transforms the underlying level of biological intentionality, but this still doesn't mean that the underlying level is not a precondition for human intentionality.
If we consider intentionality as the basic meaningful relation a living system maintains with its external world, and if we don't want to give a purely phenomenological reading here, how do we proceed? We should ask ourselves what the biological dimension means, how it is different from the non-living realm, and why this is crucial for understanding a possible emerging of intentionality.
To start from the biological means to start from the fact that there is a third term between (mere) matter and the mental (cf. Sheets-Johnstone, 1998, p. 262) . In addressing the issue this way, the conditions under which the emergence of mental phenomena such as intentionality occurs could shed another light on the history of the mental and therefore on the mental itself. It could also explain why it is fatal to neglect the material biological body as a decisive instance in bringing about mental phenomena. This article thus intends to set out a program for studying intentionality starting from a biological point of view and with a phenomenological background. We have chosen to restrict ourselves to two particularities of living systems: the inside/outside distinction they exhibit, and the fact that they are sensitive.
l The reason for the first choice is this: no system can have the conditions for intentionality if that system does not actively make a distinction between an inside and an outside. The issue of sensitivity is a related one: only sensitive systems can actively make and maintain the inside/outside distinction.
The inside/outside-distinction
To say that living systems exhibit an inside/outside-distinction immediately raises the question in what way living systems have an inside and an outside, and in what respects this distinction differs from the inside/outside-distinction that can be attributed to most entities. We shall briefly give two accounts, one general, applicable to all things, and one more specific, applicable only to living systems. These accounts represent two extremes and should inclicate two points. First, it is not possible to talk of an inside/outside-distinction without talking about boundaries. Second, the attribution of a particular kind of inside/outsidedistinction will be restricted to living systems.
Systems in general
Take as an example Bunge's (1992) view of systems. He starts by choosing two sets: the set of all the components of the system, which he calls the composition, and the set of the environmental items that act on the composition or are acted upon by the composition, which he calls the environment of the system. The boundary of a system consists of all the boundary components, and a boundary component is defined as a component that contains in all its neighbourhoods (which is a specific topological concept here) at least one system component and at least one thing in the environment of the component. For short, a bonndary component is a point which is both part of the composition and a point of contact between the composition and the environment. Now Bunge can define the inside of a system: the inside of a system is the collection of interior components, in other words the composition without the boundary components. Moreover, some systems have no inside: they are hollow. Hollow systems are fully accessible from the outside. This means that all other systems, those which are not hollow, must be penetrated (at least conceptually) to be known. According to these definitions, a stone as well as a living being, in fact all things in the universe -except the universe itself -have a boundary, and all of them -except hollow systems -have an inside.
What do we gain from this account? First, the boundary is an integral part of the system. It is not just the delimitation of the system, bnt an actual part of the system. Consider, in opposition to this, something contained in a boundary which is not a proper part of what is contained, e.g. a certain volume of gas in a container. The gas doesn't have a boundary as an inherent part, but the boundary remains external to it and is for example only delimiting the volume of gas. We already know from Bunge that a proper boundary is a point of contact between the system and the environment. In the gas example, the container is not a point of contact between the gas and the environment. Because the boundary is an actual part of the system, we will return to the question as to what the actual status of the boundary is for the system, and whether there is a difference in terms of status for non-living versus living systems.
Second, as far as the environment is concerned, Bunge selects which items are to be called environmental using the criterion of acting: does the item act on the composition or is it acted upon by the composition. Why? Apparently because a description of the system is only appropriate if one takes into account what is relevant with respect to changes caused by or effected upon the system in interaction with the environment. Such a description, however, is made from an observer's point of view; it is not a question of what is relevant from the system's point of view.
Third, one may question whether only hollow systems are completely accessible from the outside, and vice versa, whether all non-hollow systems must be penetrated in order to be known. If "to know" means to be able to predict its behavio ur, further distinctions will have to be made.
Living and non-living systems
For a second account, we take Claude Bernard (1966) , the famous 19th century physiologist, who made the contribution of distinguishing living beings and mere matter by means of their different "milieus". The reason why we have chosen Bernard is that he anticipates recent work done precisely on this topic, and because he gives a Iirst and rather intuitive account of the distinction.
In general, Bernard assumes that the antique emblem that represents life as a circle formed by a serpent biting its own tail is an adequate representation. On the one hand, the organism forms a closed circle, because there is a kind of reciprocal or circular solidarity between the different organs. The functions of the different organs sustain each other and a "perpetual movement" arises, until the activity of a vital organ is seriously disorganized and the equilibrium is broken. On the other hand, the serpent has a head and a tail, in the sense that not every aspect of the organism is of equal importance for sustaining the vital circle (Bernard, 1966, p. 152-153) . Further, Bernard formulates the difference between the living and the non-living in the framework of Iinding a good method for an experimental physician. The inhial problem is that there seem s to be a "vital force" by which a living body is capable of resisting the general physical and chemical influences of the environment. As a result, the living also seems to resist experiments. This is in opposition to mere matter, which does not exhibit any spontaneity. The spontaneity of an organism is due to the fact that it has an internal milieu, which obliges us to study organisms in another way than mere things. For experiments on mere matter, one has to take only one "milieu" into account, namely the external "cosmie' milieu. In order to examine the living, one has to consider two milieus: the external or extraorganic milieu and the internal or intra-organic milieu (Bernard, 1966, p. 11 4) .
The internal milieu of the living has a specilic status and a specific relation to the external milieu. The internal milieu is a proper product of the organism, and it maintains the necessary exchanges and equilibria with the external cosmic milieu. The more the organism becomes "perfect," the more tbe organic milieu becomes specialized and the more it becomes isolated from the ambient milieu (Bernard, 1966, p. 115) . The functions of an organism seem to be free and independent from the physical-chemical conditions of the external milieu, because the proper excitants are to be situated in the internal organic milieu (Bernard, 1966, p. 139) . Nevertheless, this isolation should not be understood in an absolute sense, because the conditions for life are not to be situated inside the organism, nor in the external milieu, but in both at the same time (Bernard, 1966, p. 132 ) .
Moreover, it is only by passing through the internal milieu that the influences of the external milieu can affect the organism. This entails that knowledge of the external milieu alone is not sufficient to know the way in which the organism reacts. One has to know the processes that take place in the internal milieu as well. Bernard even says that in the study of the internal milieu we learn all there is to know about the influence of the external milieu.
But apart from a "free communication" of the organism with the extraorganic milieu, Bernard adds the following crucial remark: "The organism is merely a living machine, built in such a way that there is, on the one hand, a free communication between the external milieu and the organic milieu, and, on the other hand, that there are protective functions of the organic elements in order to preserve the material of life and to maintain without interruption the humidity, temperature and other conditions which are indispensable for the vital activity" (Bernard, 1966, p. 134, my translation, italics added) . Apart from the protective functions, we also find functions of repair: the living can only maintain its movement because there is an internal mechanism that repairs the losses caused by the exercise of the several functions (Bernard, 1966, p. 139 ).
The exercise of functions, including functions of repair, is only possible if there are functions of repair. Bernard does not state this point very explicitly, but if we keep his idea of the circular organization of life in mind, we see that the serpent bites its tail again.
Inside, outside and the boundary
The general and external milieu is common to all bodies, living and non-living. The internal milieu, however, maintained by the organism, is proper to each living being. According to Bernard, it is because of this internal milieu that living beings seem to be more independent of the environment than non-living objects. Organisms can change without there being an indication of change in the environment, and changes in the environment often are of no impact on the organism. More recently, Damasio (2000, p. 136) has said: "Through thick and thin, even when large variations occur in the environment that surrounds the organism, there is a dispositional arrangement available in the organism's structure that modifies the inner workings of the organism. The dispositional arrangement ensures th at the environmental variations do not cause a correspondingly large and excessive variation within." By creating an internal milieu of its own which is dynamically structured, the living system exhibits a process of detachment from its external milieu. It becomes, to some extent, independent and isolated from its environment. Nevertheless, the detachment and isolation are never complete, because it is only by interaction with the external milieu that detachment can be attained.
The inside of a living system is particular because it is actively maintainedby the organism by means of very specific processes. By contrast, a stone does not actively maintain its boundaries and its inside in order to maintain its existence. A stone can be said to preserve integrity through strong bonds by which it is isolated from the environment (d. Collier, 1999) . But it does not maintain an active relation with the environment in order to protect its internal integrity. The interaction between a stone and its environment is merely physical and chemical. The way a living being tries not to fall apart is different from the way a stone does, because a living system exerts a functional activity toward the external milieu in order to preserve its internal milieu, while the external milieu only interacts with the system in a physical-chemical way (cf. Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2000) . The changes that fo llow an interaction between a living system and its environment cannot be accounted for merely in terms of the physical-chemical properties of the environment. These are a "disturbing factor," but what this means is determined by the functional activity of the system itself.
Certainly, because of their internal milieu, living beings are not fully accessible from the outside -not only because they have an inside, but because they possess an internal milieu, which, together with the external milieu, makes up the causes of change and stability. Stones only possess an external milieu, which means that their cause of change is to be situated in the external milieu and only there. In that way, stones are fully accessible from the outside. The behaviour of a stone is a linear function of the input from the external milieu. If, in the case of the living, only the external milieu is studied, the system is studied as a mere object, not as an organism.
Moreover, and in contradistinction to Bunge, the recognition of an internal milieu gives us a first possibility for assessing a (living) system from its own point of view, because it gives a criterion for assessing what is relevant for the organism with respect to its self-maintenance. Not every change will affect the identity or the circular "solidarity" of the internal milieu. One could conceptualize this easily in terms of what is relevant for the "operational closure" of the system (for an introduction, cf. Maturana et al., 1984) . The antique emblem that Bernard likes so much is an intuitive approach to this.
But what about the boundary? According to Damasio (2000, p. 135) , the notion of boundary is crucial in understanding living beings: "One key to understanding living organisms, from those that are made up of one cell to those that are made up of billions of cells, is the definition of their boundary, the separation between what is in and what is out. The structure of the organism is inside the boundary and the life of the organism is defined by the maintenance of internal states within the boundary."
To maintain the internal milieu is first of all to maintain a fundamental asymmetry between the inside and the outside. Consider the example of a cell, as the basic element of living beings. Living beings are characterized by a chemical composition that differs from that of the external milieu, and more precisely by a different proportion of the chemical elements at either side of the cell membrane. One of the fundamental activities of cells is to take in, in a selective way, certain substances from the milieu, in order to concentrate them, and also to reject certain substances into the external milieu. These specific and controlled exchanges with the external allow the maintenance of the fundamental asymmetry between the cell and its environment. The need for a boundary is not just to demarcate an inside from an outside, but also to make such a distinction between two fundamentally different milieus possible. Though it is difficult to imagine an entity without boundaries of some sort, in the case of the living, boundaries are of a particular kind: they enable the existence and maintenance of an internal milieu. The status of the boundary is thus not only to establish a distinction between inside and outside, but also to enable a selective and functional exchange between the internal and the external milieu.
In short, a boundary is at the same time in service of isolation and interaction, and the process of isolation and interaction is in service of the maintenance of the internal milieu and the boundary.
Internal and external milieus: Instances of cohesion?
The following point should be further elucidated. According to Collier (1999, p. 76 ), a stone is cohesive in another way than a living system. He defines it as follows: "Cohesion is the closure of the unity relation among parts of a natural system comprised by the dynamical (including functional) processes that maintain system integrity in the face of external and internal fiuctuations." A stone possesses coherence because of this individuating principle: there are strong internal bonds that isolate a stone from the environment. These bonds must be stronger than internal and external disturbances.
In the case of the living, something extra is required. In order to maintain its integrity, the system must perform an activity. The system can maintain its integrity only if it actively contributes to its own existence. One may think again of Maturana and Varela's "operational closure." However, this is not enough. Cohesion can be attained only if there is an active relation with the environment or the external milieu, both in a positive (matter and energy) and a negative sense (things or events that put the integrity of the entity at risk). Collier refers to this as interaction closure. The process closure, however, should be greater than the interaction closure.
We have two necessarily-related senses of cohesion here: an internal and an external one (Meire, 1994) . It is only because of the indispensable coupling of the two that an entity can be autonomous. Autonomy, then, is a special form of cohesion (and thus a special form of process closure), namely a cohesion that can be attained only by an interaction closure.' The interaction closure could be called an external cohesion. This means that the external cohesion is the creation of an external milieu that is made functional for the internal cohesion. An external milieu is created in the sense that it is selected by the organism. It may seem rather paradoxical that an organism can obtain autonomy only by taking the external milieu into account. But the elaboration of a living being cannot be done without the external milieu's inferring. A part of the environment is selected by the organism in order to take part in its circular organization. The external milieu must be coherent with respect to the internal milieu. The organism can do this by changing itself or by changing the external milieu. One might say that the external cohesion is a functional (and thus selective) extension of the internal cohesion.
The combination of internal and external cohesion renders a system autonomous. According to Collier (1999, p. 76) , "a system is autonomous if it uses its own information to modify itself and its environment to enhance its survival, responding to both environmental and internal stimuli to modify its basic functions to increase its viability."
Though a single cell is already a complex and coherent entity, in which the management of energy and matter is in service of the maintenance of the cell, we shall take homoeothermic animals as an example. The idea that living systems are autonomous also means that they behave as coherent entities, which is not reducible to the physical and chemical laws of the environment. In addition to the laws of the external environment, they lay down laws that sometimes counteract the external laws. The law governing its functioning is self-generated. This is necessary given the fundamental asymmetry between the living and the environment. If the system were to obey the laws that govern the external milieu, it would soon perish.
Let us illustrate this with an example. Homoeothermic animals have sophisticated mechanisms to keep the temperature of the internal milieu constant, no matter what happens (within limits of course) to the temperature of the external milieu (Smith, 2000) . Homeostatic mechanisms operate quickly and effectively and prevent the body temperature from rising or falling to match that of the environment. In other words, because of homeostatic mechanisms, the organism gains some independence from or autonomy towards its external environment. It has an internal regulation that keeps the body temperature close to a set point.
A living system constitutes itself as an autonomous totality, not by ignoring the milieu, but by taking it into account in order to remain separate from it. Autonomy is gained not by ignoring the external milieu or by shutting oneself off fro m it, but by constantly taking it into account. Homoeothermic animals constantly inform themselves about the circumambient temperature in order to maintain their own temperature around the set point. The more living beings are able to cope with a larger part of the environment, the more they are "open" towards the external milieu and the more they are able to maintain their internal milieu.
Traditionally, the external coherence of a living entity only matters on the level of natural selection: the living must be coherent with the milieu in order to survive. In that view, the living is not the active subject of its relations with the external milieu, but only the object of natural selection. If we consider, in opposition to the traditional point of view, the external milieu as the result of the active maintenance of the internal milieu, living systems can no longer be passive instances.
All this goes to show that living organisms should have some kind of sensitivity in order to be informed about the internal and external milieus.
Sensitivity
The issue of sensitivity is a complicated one, but not extensively pursued by philosophers, who like to focus straight away on sensation. The link between sensation and sensitivity is undeniable, but in discussing sensation, sensitivity and the sense organs are often absent.
The "protective functions" mentioned by Claude Bernard are difficult to conceive of without the organism's being sensitive. Even a single cell has to be sensitive in order to be autonomous. The boundary, apart from its other characteristics (cf. supra), turns out to be a sensitive interface that reacts selectively to both the internal and external milieu. Damasio (2000, p. J 38-this point follows an explicit reference to Claude Bernard) stresses the need to sense the internal milieu: "The unwitting and unconscious urge to stay alive betrays itself inside a simple cell in a complicated operation that requires 'sensing' the state of the chemical profile inside the boundary, and that requires unwitting, 'unconscious knowledge' of what to do, chemically speaking, when the sensing reveals too little or too much of some ingredient at some place or time within the cell. " Here, the sensitivity of an organism is related to the urge to stay alive, or to the maintenance of the internal milieu, which has to be sensed. Sensory systems can be categorized according to the type of energy sensed, but also based on whether the sensory ending looks inward at the internal milieu (interoreceptors) or outward at the external milieu (exteroreceptors) (Smith, 2000) . Photoreceptors are exteroreceptors, because there is no electromagnetic field within the body that has to be sensed. The other modalities (related to mechanic stress, chemicals and temperature) can be both exteroreceptors and interoreceptors. Although interoreceptors are often not as complex as exteroreceptors, no biologist will deny the importance of interoreceptors, which are essential for the homeostasis that the continued maintenance of the organism depends on. In the case of mammals, we have clear cases of interoreception, by which the major parameters of the internal milieu, such as pH, 0 " and CO, are kept constant.
An interesting case is the sensing of osmotic stress (based on Smith, 2000) . Some animals are able to control via hormones the osmolarity of their internal milieu. This means that they are able to prevent the osmolarity of their internal milieu from coming into equilibrium with the osmolarity of the external milieu. The control depends on sensing changes in the osmolarity of the internal milieu (the eXLra-celiular fluid ). The sensing is done by stretch receptors in the membranes of osmoreceptor cells (for mammals, these cells are located in the hypothalamus). But unicellulars, such as bacteria, also have such receptors. What role do these receptors have? Though the answer is not generally accepted, it probably has to do with osmoregulation. When bacteria are exposed to fresh water, water molecules flow down their concentration gradients into the cell. As a consequence, the cell swells. This is osmotic stress and would be sensed by mechanosensitive channels in the membrane. When the membrane is stretcbed. tbe subunits of a cbannel are pulled apart and solutes flow out in sucb a way tbat the osmotic stress is counteracted (tbe concentration gradient is made less steep). So in botb cases. tbese receptors serve tbe maintenance of tbe inner milieu. In mammals. for example. tbese receptors are interoreceptors. But wbat witb bacteria? Here. the receptors are also located at the cell boundary. but the cell boundary is at the same time the boundary of tbe organism. It is neither the internal nor tbe external milieu in particular that is sensed. but the state of tbe membrane itself.
If we take a closer look at sensitivity. tbe problem is wbether sensitivity is abo ut the internal. tbe external. or tbe boundary. Of course. Damasio is right in saying tbat tbe sensing is in function oftbe internal milieu. but be also says tbat it is about tbe cbemical state of wbat is inside the boundary. N. Humpbrey. on the otber hand. in tracing tbe bistory of sensory consciousness (Humphrey. 1999) . sometimes raises confu sion in paralleling sensation and perception. Humpbrey is certainly correct in stressing sensation. and in seeing sensation as emerging from a phenomenon at the boundaries. According to Humpbrey. sensation is about wbat is bappening to the organism. while perception is about what is happening out tbere. But this preoccupation with perception (wbicb is about the external. according to bim) means that sensitivity as sensing tbe internal milieu is lost from sigbt and is unable to playa role in an eventual emerging of sensation. However. we migbt be moving too quickly bere. as ancient instances of sensitivity migbt not clearly refer to an inside or an outside milieu. but rather co ncern tbe boundary itself. Sheets-Johnstone. for example. claims tbat internal proprioceptors have derived from external proprioceptive bodily structures (Sheets-Johnstone. 1998. p. 286) .
If anyone claims that tbe inside/outside demarcation is essential to living beings and that sensitivity is essential in conserving this distinction. then a history of sensitivity is required. But once tbe inside/outside distinction and the sensitivity are traced. one should become careful in inferring conclusions.
Conclusions
From the inside/outside distinction and the issue of sensitivity. one might immediately jump to considerations concerning mental phenomena. such as "self) and "self-co nsciousness" on the one hand, and sensation and (external) perception on the other hand. We shall not parallel these phenomena herefirst of all. because we think that the relation between the biological and the mental is much more complicated and paradoxical than a mere parallel. And second, because such a procedure would deny the emergence of different levels, in which a second level can alter the first level. Nevertheless, we claim that the above is the only way in which an understanding of mental phenomena, and intentionality in particular, can be prepared. In more concrete terms, the biological level exhibits the fundamental characteristics of the intentional relation, phenomenologically conceived.
No one denies that the mental is built upon the biological, but this does not mean that the constitutive role of the biological for the mental is recognized. So, what do we need in order to trace a history of intentionality? We need the general framework of living systems, characterized as active poles. Living systems are active in the following way: they actively make a distinction between inside and outside, they actively produce and maintain themselves, and they interact in an active way with the environment in order to maintain themselves. In this context, sensitivity can be considered as the first structure that enables meaningful relations with the external. Without sensitivity, the interactions (both within the organism and with the environment) could never be meaningful, i.e. they could never refer to what is important for the organism's own maintenance.
Though the status of sensitivity in respect to what it "refers" to (inside or outside) is ambivalent, sensitivity is essential for the necessary coupling of internal and external cohesion. And here we find the basic characteristics of the intentional relation, which is fundamental of a being-in-the-world: an inside relates itself actively and meaningfully to an outside. We are still far away from mental intentionality here, but if we follow the phenomenological tradition in which intentionality is considered as an active and meaningful relation to the outside world, it makes good sense to start at the biological level.
The issue here is not to conceive of these two characteristics in parallel, on the biological and the mental levels, but to understand how such characteristics at the mental level can find their founding layer in the biological. Apart from that, one could begin to understand why the living matter, or the body, plays a crucial role -not only because it is the body that is at stake, but also because the meaningfulness is embodied into the very structure of the organism itself. So even before the mental appears, the organism already is an instance that actively relates itself to the external world. As an entity that has the urge to stay alive, it has to make an evaluative stand against what happens in the internal milieu and against what arrives from the external world J A further step is to ask what boundaries, cohesion, autonomy, activity and meaning could be at the level of the mental and how this new level alters and/or accomplishes the biological level. To talk about intentionality on this level necessarily means to take a stance toward the biological level and to keep the biological preconditions for the emergence of this level in mind. Notes 1. Of course, these two characteristics are unsatisfactory to give an account of the living. We only claim that they are of particular interest for a history of intentionality.
2. For Collier, interaction closure does not only refer to external interaction, but to internal interaction as well.
3. On e might object that it is not possible to talk of meaningfulness and value on the biol ogical level. Concerning meaningfulness, one might prefer to talk instead in terms of functions. We think this does not alter the meaningfulness in it. Moreover, talking about functions is impossible without values, no matter how implicit the reference to value is.
